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Introduction 
In the agriculture sector, if farmers are to be more competi-
tive in both domestic and international markets their supply 
chains need to be more efficient and more effective [1]. To 
improve the competitiveness of supply chains, a holistic 
approach is required to address all aspects of the chain in-
cluding input suppliers, production, processing, handling, 
distribution and marketing. 
 
In the transitional economies, postharvest losses of perish-
able commodities often range between 40–60% of harvest 
[2]. The primary factors responsible for these losses are poor 
preharvest measures, the adoption of poor production tech-
niques, inappropriate harvesting procedures, non-application 
of recommended preharvest practices, improper post-harvest 
care, packing in bulk without grading and sorting, improper 
transportation and storage, inaccessible markets and limited 
access to market information.  
 
There is also a belief in many transitional economies that 
small farmers are exploited by market intermediaries. In 
most transitional economies, the agricultural marketing sys-
tem is characterised by a highly atomistic production side 
where there are many small, widely-dispersed farmers grow-
ing highly perishable crops and an oligopolistic marketing 
system where there are only a few traders [3]. Marketing 
costs are often high because of an inefficient transport sys-
tem, inadequate cool storage capacity and significant varia-
tions in product form, variety and quality [4]. The supply 
chain itself is often long and protracted and involves a large 
number of market intermediaries [5]. Furthermore, loca-
tional factors may limit the number of market intermediaries 
available to transact with primary producers [6]. In other 
instances, the need for working capital may lock farmers 
into long-term relationships where the farmer is, to varying 
degrees, more or less dependent on a market intermediary 
[3]. 
 
These problems are also common among vegetable farmers 
in the Southern Philippines. In the absence of sufficient 
working capital, most vegetable farmers must borrow from 
market intermediaries at rates of interest ranging from 30–
53% [7]. High postharvest losses are compounded by ineffi-
ciencies that appear to start at the farm level due to poor 
infrastructure and poor production techniques.  
 
The adoption of a supply chain framework theoretically 
enables farmers to better meet the needs of their down-
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 stream customers. However, just as important is the need for 
downstream customers to satisfy the farmer’s needs. Failure 
by either party in the transaction to satisfy the needs of their 
preferred trading partner will potentially introduce conflict 
into the exchange, thereby increasing transaction costs and 
reducing the efficiency of the market.  
 
Transaction costs 
Developed primarily by Williamson [8, 9], transaction cost 
theory assumes that various costs are associated with an ex-
change. These costs are comprised of the costs of obtaining 
and processing information, negotiating contracts, monitoring 
agents and enforcing contracts. These costs may become sig-
nificant in the presence of information asymmetry, uncer-
tainty and transaction specific investments. 
 
Although there are several different approaches towards 
measuring the level and effects of transaction costs, Frank 
and Henderson [10] employ various measures to evaluate the 
costs of uncertainty, transaction specific investments and the 
costs of co-ordination and concentration. Market concentra-
tion is a strong indicator of non-competitive pricing behav-
iour and of inefficient market performance [3]. Ordinarily, 
the presence of a few large market agents within a market is 
sufficient evidence of market power and price collusion. 
However, in order to verify the extent to which various actors 
have been exploited by unfair trading practices, the net re-
turns and marketing margins at each step in the supply chain 
need to be estimated [6]. 
 
Markets are said to be efficient if the price consumers ulti-
mately pay adequately reflects storage costs, transportation 
costs and differences in price due to product form [4]. Since 
price data is usually the most readily available and most reli-
able source of market information in developing countries 
[11], the performance of the supply chain is most often evalu-
ated using price margins. However, a large marketing margin 
may result in little or no profit for an actor and may even 
result in a trading loss, depending on the buying and selling 
prices and the costs of marketing [12]. Marketing margins 
may also fluctuate due to the perishability of the product, the 
number of actors involved in the exchange, the marketing 




As market intermediaries strive to improve customer value 
while simultaneously reducing costs, many firms derive their 
competitive advantage from more aggressive purchasing 
management [13]. A firm achieves two major benefits from 
focusing on the purchasing function; a reduction in costs and 
improved product quality. 
 
In business-to-business markets, purchasing behaviour is 
purposively directed towards the achievement of rational 
economic goals where the major objective is to find least cost 
solutions that best satisfy functional criteria. Quality, price 
and the ability to deliver are generally regarded as the most 
important criteria by which organisational buyers evaluate 
potential suppliers [14, 15, 16, 17]. Where there is no diffi-
culty in accurately specifying the exact nature of the product 
and there are several reliable suppliers in the market, a buyer 
can simply choose that supplier who offers the lowest price 
from among all those who fulfil the functional requirements 
[18].  
 
However, there is increasing evidence in business-to-business 
markets that the importance of price as a key variable in sup-
plier selection is decreasing in importance [17, 19]. Even in 
the pursuit of lower costs, quality is emerging as the most 
important issue. Competing on price alone may lead to addi-
tional costs because of inferior quality, unreliable delivery, 
limited quantities and inadequate communication. As suppli-
ers’ account for 30% of quality problems and 80% of the 
problems associated with lead times [20], market intermedi-
aries will understandably seek to reduce these costs and to 
achieve greater market coordination through developing 
more cooperative long-term buyer-seller relationships [17]. 
 
In describing a supplier’s offer quality, Gronroos [21] finds it 
necessary to differentiate between technical quality and func-
tional quality. Technical quality describes the customer’s 
specifications. This is a physical description of the product in 
terms of its size, shape, colour, freedom from pests and dis-
eases, purity (in terms of its freedom from chemical contami-
nants, pathogenic organisms and genetically modified 
plants), maturity or freshness, and the manner in which the 
product is packed [22]. 
 
Functional quality describes the way a supplier goes about 
delivering the product to the customer [21]. While this funda-
mentally means being able to deliver the product when the 
customer wants it, by implication, it involves many inter-
related activities such as production scheduling, storage and 
warehousing, logistics, ordering and invoicing. Since most 
market intermediaries purchase products in the expectation 
that they will be able to resell them, the timely and efficient 
receipt of goods is critical to the success of most downstream 
manufacturing and retail operations.  
 
Even so, Batt [22] finds it necessary to add an additional di-
mension: service quality. Service quality best describes the 
extra things a supplier is prepared to do to retain the cus-
tomer’s business. While the exact meaning of the term ser-
vice varies with the nature of the product and the require-
ments of the buying organisation [23], service may include 
such variables as providing technical assistance, innovative 
suggestions to improve the profitability of a customer’s op-
erations, support for special needs, or advance notice of im-
pending changes in price or shortages in supply. 
 
In measuring the extent to which suppliers are able to meet 
the needs of their customers, Parasuraman et al. [24], pro-
Batt et al. / Stewart Postharvest Review 2006, 3:6 
  3 
 posed the concept of a service gap, which is a measure of 
how well the service level delivered by a supplier matches 
customers’ expectations. An integral part of this analysis is 
concerned with the identification of the various constraints 
that prevent the supplier from fulfilling the customer’s needs. 
It is only after these constraints have been identified that the 
supplier can improve their performance. 
 
However, this approach addresses only one side of the trans-
action. While a great deal has been written about the manner 
in which a customer selects a preferred supplier, significantly 
less information is available to describe how producers and 
market intermediaries select downstream trading partners.  
 
Rational economic theory would suggest that farmers will 
seek to transact with those buyers who offer the highest price. 
However, unless the transaction concludes with the exchange 
of produce for cash, additional costs may be incurred and 
there is the potential risk of non-payment. Where it is neces-
sary to offer credit, farmers will seek to transact with those 
exchange partners who have a good reputation and with 
whom they have dealt in the past. Cardozo and Cagley [25] 
and Puto et al. [26] demonstrate that buyers are strongly at-
tracted to well known or existing suppliers, for current sup-
pliers are perceived as being less risky. Lyon [27] suggests 
that where it is necessary to offer credit, farmers prefer to 
transact with local buyers because they know where to find 
them in the event of non-payment.  
 
While buyers generally seek to purchase the best quality pro-
duce available for the least cost, farmers are expected to iden-
tify those buyers who offer the highest price for good average 
quality. Assuming that farmers take the time to grade the 
produce prior to sale, most farmers will have no difficulty in 
selling better quality produce. As significant premiums are 
often paid for quality, the problem that then arises is how to 
dispose of the inferior quality produce, especially when the 
market is saturated. To overcome this problem, Batt and 
Parining [28] find that most farmers prefer to sell produce to 
distributors and collector agents without grading. 
 
Relationship marketing 
Marketing theory has been traditionally built on the market-
ing mix model where the key problem facing the marketing 
manager is to most effectively allocate the organisation’s 
limited resources to the different elements of the marketing 
mix so as to maximise customer response [29]. Implicit in the 
Four P’s approach is the concept that the customer is passive 
and only reacts to the supplier’s offer by deciding to purchase 
or not to purchase.  
 
While it is generally accepted that the concept of the Four P’s 
was developed during the 1950s in the North American mass 
market for consumer packaged goods [30], in the industrial 
market, both the buyer and supplier are active participants in 
the market. Each may engage in the search for suitable ex-
change partners, the preparation of specifications and ma-
nipulate or attempt to control the transaction process [29]. 
Purchasing is therefore an interactive process where relation-
ship building and relationship management are fundamental. 
 
Gronroos [30] defines relationship marketing as the means of 
establishing, maintaining and enhancing relationships with 
customers and other partners, at a profit, so that the objec-
tives of the parties involved in the relationship are met. This 
is achieved by mutual exchange and the fulfilment of prom-
ises. A firm must not only attract customers, but it must also 
build relationships with the customer if the goals of the rela-
tionship are to be achieved. A firm that is pre-occupied with 
giving promises may attract new customers and initially build 
relationships, but if promises are not kept, the relationship 
cannot be maintained and enhanced. By its very nature, rela-
tionship marketing seeks to enhance profitability in the long-
term through building enduring relationships with customers. 
 
A firm pursuing a relationship marketing strategy will at-
tempt to create more value for its customers than that which 
is provided by the core product itself [29]. Through installing 
capital goods, providing technical advice, developing just-in-
time logistics, adapting invoicing and a host of other ele-
ments, the relationship becomes both more attractive and 
more profitable for the customer, thus enhancing the attrac-
tiveness of an on-going relationship. As such elements are 
different types of services, the more the firm adopts a rela-
tionship marketing strategy, the more it has to understand 
how to manage the service elements of its market offer. 
 
However, not all market relationships are identical. Webster 
[31] describes relationship marketing as a continuum, an-
chored at one end by pure transactions and at the other by 
strategic alliances. A pure transaction is a one-time exchange 
of value between two parties with no prior or subsequent 
interaction. There is virtually no risk for the buyer in terms of 
either product performance or quality. All the information 
necessary for both parties to consummate the exchange is 
contained in the price. Furthermore, no investments or other 
costs are associated with switching from one vendor to an-
other. The supplier and the buyer incur no obligation towards 
one another beyond the delivery and payment for a product 
that meets specifications. At the other extreme, a strategic 
alliance constitutes a complex and enduring form of buyer-
seller relationship that involves total interdependence be-
tween the buyer and supplier. In this situation, buyers pur-
chase their total requirements from a single supplier. Due to 
many strategic linkages and interactions between the two 
parties, switching costs are high. 
 
Where there is some uncertainty surrounding an exchange, 
buyers attempt to reduce the perceived risk by either splitting 
orders between several alternative suppliers or to purchase 
from well known suppliers with whom they have dealt in the 
past [14]. Dempsey [16] and Anderson, Chu and Weitz [32] 
suggest that buyers prefer to purchase from those firms who 
are reputable market leaders, for they are perceived as being 
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 more trustworthy. Lehmann and O’Shaughnessy [15] indicate 
that when the decision to purchase involves a significant 
amount of capital, reputation becomes a very important deci-
sion variable. Reputation may be used to distinguish between 
those traders with whom a farmer will interact and those who 
will no longer be considered. 
 
Herbig and Milewicz [33] view reputation as a customer's 
estimation of the consistency over time of an attribute, based 
on an evaluation of the supplier's willingness and ability to 
perform an activity repeatedly in a similar fashion. Similarly, 
Moorman et al. [34] regard reputation as an indicator of reli-
ability. Derived primarily from personal experience, percep-
tions of a supplier's past performance may also be drawn 
from the various signalling behaviours the supplier under-
takes to both develop and maintain its reputation [35]. Repu-
tation therefore creates expectations, not only about the key 
attributes of the supplier, but about how that supplier will 
behave in the future. Reputation may not only signal a sup-
plier's ability to deliver valued outcomes to its customers in 
situations of information overload or information inadequacy, 
but may also provide an important cue about how its products 
compare with those from competing firms. 
 
In the context of developing long-term buyer-seller relation-
ships in the transitional economies, Fafchamps [36] describes 
reputation as a collective coordination and information shar-
ing device which ensures contracts are complied with. In its 
simplest form, it suggests that individuals will choose not to 
interact with those firms who are known not to comply with 
their contractual obligations. Reputation is a form of social 
collateral that can guarantee contract performance without 
prior acquaintance. Concern for ones reputation may be suffi-
cient to ensure compliance and to enable firms to offer credit 
or take large orders without knowing each other personally. 
Furthermore, within the transitional economies, there is a 
growing recognition that exchange is embedded in various 
overarching social institutions including locality, class, eth-
nicity, religion, gender and age [37, 38, 39]. The importance 
of trust and social capital as a means of reducing risk and 
facilitating exchange is becoming more evident [27, 36, 40]. 
 
For any particular potential exchange, trust will be critical if 
two situational factors are present: risk and incomplete buyer 
information. Since most potential sales transactions present 
some degree of risk and uncertainty to the potential buyer, 
without some degree of trust, the perceived risk may be too 
great for the transaction to occur. More specifically, trust 
becomes important in an exchange whenever there is a high 
level of performance ambiguity, and poor product perform-
ance will have a significant adverse impact on the value de-
rived by the buyer [41]. In such circumstances, trust acts as 
an information resource that directly reduces the perceived 
threat of information asymmetry and performance ambiguity. 
 
While a supplier’s technical and functional quality impact on 
satisfaction, both will also impact customer trust [42]. In 
those markets where relatively high levels of perceived risk 
are associated with the purchase of the product, customer 
trust can play a pivotal role in supplier selection and patron-
age. The development of trust depends on both the credibility 
of the product and the credibility of the service offered. 
 
Background to the study area 
In the three papers that follow, Digal et al. [this issue] ex-
plore the use of price margin analysis and the margins avail-
able to farmers for producing better quality produce. Concep-
cion et al. [the issue] utilise Parasuraman et al. [24] concept 
of a service gap to investigate the extent to which suppliers 
are able to meet the needs of downstream market intermedi-
aries and ultimately fulfil consumer demand. In the final pa-
per, Batt [this issue] utilises relationship marketing theory to 
explore the social aspects of the exchange including satisfac-
tion, trust, commitment, power-dependence and the willing-
ness to make relationship specific investments. All three 
studies draw their respondents from Kapatagan, a small vil-
lage on the slopes of Mt Apo and from the various market 
intermediaries involved in the distribution of the fresh vege-
tables cultivated to metropolitan markets in Mindanao. 
 
Kapatagan, a name which means “plains”, is an area of about 
6,675 hectares, located in part of an area proclaimed by the 
Philippine Government as a National Park in 1932. When 
logging operations ceased, many of the workers and their 
families remained. Initially the land was used for cultivating 
coffee, but when residents from nearby towns learned of the 
fertile, productive and vast lands in Kapatagan, others started 
to occupy the area. Today, some 1,700 households depend on 
the cultivation of temperate vegetable crops for their main 
source of income. Most farms are very small, ranging in size 
from 0.6–1.0 hectares, with most being comprised of 1–5 
small parcels of land, often at different altitudes. While most 
farmers consider themselves to be the owners of the land they 
cultivate, landowners in Kapatagan have no formal title to the 
land, although a stewardship agreement was granted by the 
Digos City government. 
 
Lying at the foot of Mt. Apo, the highest peak in the Philip-
pines, Kapatagan is at an elevation of between 1,100–1,600 
meters above sea level. The climate is cool with an average 
temperature of 22–25oC, with no pronounced rainy period or 
long dry season. The prevalent wind direction is Northeast to 
Southwest throughout the year. The growing area is safe 
from typhoons because it lies outside the typhoon belt and is 
further protected by its mountainous borders. The topography 
ranges from level to gently sloping terrain (8%), strongly 
sloping (18–20%) and hilly (30–50%). According to official 
records, in 2001, approximately 2,500 hectares or 37% of the 
area available was cultivated. 
 
Kapatagan is an ideal place for planting temperate vegetables 
(cabbage, tomatoes, bell pepper, Chinese cabbage, Baguio 
beans, carrots), root crops (potatoes and sweet potato) and 
other agricultural products. Vegetables are produced and 
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marketed mainly in the surrounding towns, including Digos, 
Kidapawan, Cotabato and Davao. Other buyers come from 
Cagayan de Oro, Surigao and Agusan and there are some 
buyers from the Visayas, including Tacloban, Iloilo and 
Cebu. 
 
The farmer, or as they are locally known “planters”, culti-
vate, harvest and pack the produce in sacks or crates. Some 
of these farmers (hurnal) also provide farm labour 
(individual, group or family) to other farms. The hurnal are 
paid either daily or on a per job basis (pakyaw). The hurnal 
activity provides additional income for the farmers who are 
waiting to harvest their own produce.  
 
After harvest, most farmers transport their products from the 
farm to the trading area through the karyador (Figure 1). The 
karyador brings the produce to the Trading Post, directly to 
the truck (traders) or to the warehouse operators (bodega). 
There are also instances where farmers employ the services 
of motorcycle drivers instead of the karyador. On the other 
hand, some of the farmers bring their products straight to the 
traders and bodega operators, while some products are col-
lected from the farm by traders. The bodega operators per-
form the role of storing the vegetables. By storing, they are 
able to choose their buyers and allocate vegetables to those 
buyers who offer the highest returns making their part of the 
chain more efficient. 
 
In the trading area, agents (ahente) move around to look for 
products to purchase. However, there are also agents who 
have pre-ordered some products from the farmers and will 
pick it up in the Trading Post. The agents sell the farmers’ 
produce to the buyers. They generally receive Ps 1–2 for 
every kg of vegetables they sell. It does not matter whether 
the price of the vegetable is high or low, the agents still get 
their margin.  
 
Another variation of the agents is the warikwarik. The term 
warikwarik originally referred to jeepney drivers who did not 
wait for their turn in the terminal. They left the terminal and 
simply picked up passengers along the way. They were de-
fined locally as “strikers” or “strike anywhere”. In the case of 
vegetable selling, the warikwarik is an individual who buys 
and sells vegetables in smaller quantities and deals less fre-
quently than the regular buyers. 
 
There are also instances when the farmers sell their produce 
direct to retail. Carrying only a few sacks of produce, they 
hitch a ride with the trucks that have purchased vegetables 
from the Trading Post. They then sell their produce in the 
public markets and are locally known as bolanteros. 
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